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Illicit livelihoods: Drug Crops and Development in Africa 
 
Carrier, N., Klantschnig, G. 
 
Illicit drugs are increasingly seen as a developmental issue. While portrayed as a 
threat to all parts of the world, their impact on ‘developing countries’ is seen as 
especially dangerous, imperilling hopes of progress towards more prosperous futures. 
Until recently most concern about a drugs-development nexus had focused on Latin 
America as well as Asia, where the global trade in cocaine and heroin has long been 
seen as destabilising societies, spreading consumption and addiction in its wake 
(UNODC 1994). However, much recent focus has shifted to Africa, regarded as the 
latest target in the global ‘war on drugs’ (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012).  
 
Much of this focus on Africa emerges from a trend in recent years for 
international cocaine smugglers to use routes through Africa to get shipments to 
Europe. Guinea-Bissau has been a major concern in this regard, described as Africa’s 
first ‘narco-state’, but the whole western coastline of the continent, as well as the 
Sahel region, have been seen as threatened by an ‘invisible tide’ of drug smuggling, 
weakening already weak states, and bringing addiction along with consumption 
(Observer 2008; Sunday Times 2009; El Pais 2009; Cockayne and Williams 2009). 
Africa, of course, is also a continent long targeted by initiatives designed to improve 
the lives of those deemed underdeveloped, being a key terrain for the development 
industry. Given the common framing of the continent as somewhere hindered by 
underdevelopment and poor governance and given the apparently new threat it faces 
from drugs, there is deep concern that these substances will harm Africa’s 
developmental prospects (Costa 2008a; UNODC 2010a; Morris 2010). 
 
While there are many dangers for the continent linked to drugs and the drug 
trade, this article will suggest that a received wisdom that glibly ascribes a negative 
effect to all such substances and their trade should be critiqued. There are many 
shades of grey: the category of ‘illicit drugs’ contains substances of very different 
harm potential, often only linked through their classification as ‘illegal’ in 
international and national legislation, while some of the potentially most harmful 
substances are legal: tobacco and alcoholic drinks (Nutt, King and Philips 2010). 
Furthermore, some substances – khat (the stems and leaves of the shrub Catha edulis 
chewed as a stimulant) and cannabis – in certain contexts – especially in rural Africa 
– are highly ambiguous in their relation to development, playing an important role in 
livelihoods and poverty alleviation, a key contemporary focus of development 
projects. In fact, such substances impact on far more lives in Africa than cocaine and 
heroin: the latter commodities show worrying signs of increasing demand within 
Africa (their use has spilled over from the use of African countries as transhipment 
hubs (Vigh 2012; McCurdy 2014)), but still they are out-competed considerably by 
the likes of cannabis as seizure charts in the World Drug Report invariably reveal 
(WDR 2015). Yet concern about cocaine and heroin comes to stand for all substances 
described by the loaded term ‘drug’. 
 
This article assesses the impact of drugs on agricultural production and trade 
and how drugs have affected African development more broadly through case studies 
of cannabis and khat. It actively engages with recent research that has started to 
explore the links between drugs and development in Africa, and challenges some of 
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its key assumptions. It argues that based on the available empirical evidence, the 
causalities between drugs and underdevelopment are not always apparent. The article 
proposes a more nuanced understanding of the economic impact of cannabis and khat, 
in particular as agricultural crops and trading commodities, and how they have 
provided farmers and entrepreneurs with opportunities not readily available in 
difficult economic environments. Drawing on empirical material from Lesotho, 
Nigeria and Kenya,1 the article shows the role that cannabis and khat have come to 
play in local livelihoods, particularly as a means of agricultural diversification – a role 
already hinted at in Bernstein’s seminal study on cannabis in Ghana (1999: 29-30). 
However, they are not a panacea for development in rural Africa: the article also 
shows the limits of these often-illicit livelihoods, as they expose farmers and traders 
to many of the risks common to other agricultural cash crops, as well as those more 
particular to the illicit. 
 
 
Drugs as Anti-Development 
 
During the last 10 years growing attention has been paid to drugs as a developmental 
issue in Africa, a continent that over many decades has seen a wealth of projects 
designed to increase social and economic well-being – or, at the least, alleviate 
hardship – through ‘development’.2 Drugs, corruption and crime go together, it is 
argued, destabilizing societies, reducing productivity, thus impeding development. 
Such is the received wisdom commonly seen in reports and conferences under the 
aegis of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 1994, 2010a; Morris 2010). 
Indeed, the former head of the UNODC – Antonio Maria Costa – lamented in 2008 
how ‘the cocaine used in Europe passes through impoverished countries in West 
Africa, where the drugs trade is causing untold misery, corruption, violence and 
instability’ (Costa 2008a). In all this, Africa is constructed as a passive victim at the 
mercy of the global drug trade. 
 
However, the drugs and development nexus is not just linked to concern for 
African countries, but also connects with anxieties in the West. The growing 
‘securitisation’ of development in the wake of the attacks of 11 September has meant 
that overseas aid spending has often been justified to the public as essential for 
security at home (Bachmann and Hoenke 2010; Gebresenbet 2015). Reported links 
between terrorist groups and drug smugglers, for instance in Mali, have accentuated 
this concern, as suggested by a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office report on 
                                                        
1 This article draws on long-term research into Africa’s drugs trade by Carrier and Klantschnig. Carrier 
has researched khat and other drugs historically and ethnographically (principally in Kenya and among 
the Somali diaspora) since 1998, and conducted further surveys and interviews on the production, trade 
and use of khat during a recent (2011-13) project on Nairobi’s Eastleigh estate, a major hub for the 
substance. Klantschnig has conducted in-depth research into Nigeria’s licit and illicit drug trades and 
related policy since 2003. During fieldwork in 2005, 2007 and 2010 he gathered archival, government 
and market data (primarily drug prices) on Nigeria’s evolving cannabis trade and interviewed a number 
of cannabis entrepreneurs and control officials in Lagos and Kaduna. In addition to these sources 
collected during fieldwork in Kenya and Nigeria, this article is also based on a thorough reading of 
secondary and grey literature. 
2 ‘Development’, of course, is notoriously difficult to define as it means so many things to many 
different people (Cowen and Shenton 1996). For the purposes of this article we focus on the role of 
cannabis and khat in livelihoods, and use the term in a broad sense that encompasses both poverty 
alleviation and the improvement of living conditions.   
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‘Traffickers and Terrorists’ of 2013 (FCO 2013). Also, improving economic 
conditions in countries now seen as entrepôts for the drugs trade is seen as a way to 
cut off illegal trade networks that thrive on underdevelopment, and so reduce supply 
to western countries (Cockayne and Williams 2009). Thus, the increasingly strong 
link between drugs and development is not merely rooted in concern for the economic 
and social welfare of African countries, but also connects to more parochial western 
concerns. 
 
Whatever the reason for the increasing attention given to drugs and 
development, the link between them emerges in several different aspects of their trade 
and use. Singer has outlined the major arguments about the negative impact of drugs 
upon developing countries (Singer 2008a). He divides up their impacts into five 
categories to which we have added a sixth, drugs’ negative impact on the state, as this 
has received extensive attention in the literature on drugs in Africa. Most examples 
used in discussions of the topic are drawn from places with such a troubled 
relationship with drugs as Colombia and Afghanistan and certainly, the drugs trade 
has played a significant role in the destabilization of these regions. In the following, 
we relate these broader arguments of drugs’ detrimental impact on development to 
African countries. 
 
First, Singer draws attention to how drugs can impact negatively a country’s 
productivity on both the supply side – through injuries and health problems acquired 
in processing drugs, and through arrests of employees in the drugs trade – and also on 
the use side, where health problems can reduce productivity of workers. In African 
countries, alcohol has been implicated in such debates since colonial times, as is khat 
(Crush and Ambler, 1992; Willis, 2002). Indeed, in the case of khat, long chewing-
sessions in the Horn of Africa and Kenya are seen by some as examples of indolence 
(Anderson and Carrier 2011: 19). However, the impact of drugs on food security is 
seen as an even greater threat. On a continent where hunger is an important concern, 
the use of land to grow drug crops is seen by many as immoral and irresponsible (for 
example, see Gebissa 2010, in relation to khat, and INCB 2003 [page 39] in relation 
to cannabis). 
 
Second, most concern about drugs revolves around the young. In Africa - 
where there is great fear of an ‘epidemic’ of drug use among youth – this is especially 
worrying given the demographic ‘youth bulge’ combined with high levels of formal 
unemployment.3 For children and youth to consume drugs is considered both 
dangerous, and a waste of their potential and productivity. In Nigeria, the earliest 
debates about cannabis in the 1960s were almost exclusively focussed on the impact 
they could have on urban youth, reproducing arguments related to alcohol in the late 
colonial period (Klantschnig 2014). The high rates of unemployment throughout the 
continent, from Lagos to the Cape Flats and Nairobi, also creates fertile environments 
for the spread of drug use among marginalized youth (Scholes 2007; McCurdy 2014). 
 
Third, Singer highlights the harm that drugs can cause to health, especially 
through the spread of blood-borne viruses such as HIV. In Africa, the relatively high 
rates of HIV/AIDS means that injecting drug use is especially dangerous, as research 
from East Africa has shown (Ratcliff, McCurdy et al 2013). But also the lack of any 
                                                        
3 On the ‘youth bulge’, see Sommers 2011. 
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sufficient medical treatment options for problem drug users has been a recurring 
concern and has been highlighted in the most recent major drug policy deliberation on 
the continent (WACD 2014).  
 
Fourth, in writings about Africa, drugs are also depicted as endangering the 
foundations of society through instigating and perpetuating violence (for a critique, 
see Laudati and Suckling in this issue). The use of cannabis amongst combatants in 
West and Central Africa is well attested, and many claim that such usage increases 
their courage and stamina levels.4 More importantly, drugs are often mentioned as 
‘conflict goods’, helping ‘warlords’ fund militias and their weaponry (Cooper 2001; 
INCB 2003). The use of khat was similarly linked to conflict in Somalia at the time of 
the country’s collapse in the late 1980s / early 1990s (Anderson and Carrier 2006). 
 
Fifth, Singer describes the developmental harm wrought by the corruption 
often linked to drugs trade, and examples of these linkages are easy to find in Africa 
as elsewhere. There are many cases of suspected drug-related corruption and even 
police officers are quite open about the bribes received from drug traders.5 
International drug agencies, in particular, have blamed this negative impact of drugs 
on state weakness in Africa, which is usually illustrated through Africa’s porous 
borders and underpaid law enforcement (for an overview, see Carrier and Klantschnig 
2012, chapter four). Cockayne and Williams argue that along with widespread 
poverty, urbanisation and youth unemployment, ‘the lack of adequate forces 
dedicated to counternarcotics’ contributes to the expansion of the drug trade and 
corruption (2009: 13). 
 
Finally, and related to the above is an argument that has gained extensive 
attention in Africa: the criminalisation of the state, as described by Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou (1999). Drug-related corruption in Africa is not restricted to low level law 
enforcers but involves figures in the high levels of government. This is especially 
associated with Guinea-Bissau where such a criminalisation of the state has generated 
the fear that the country is becoming a ‘narco-state’ (Observer 2008; Sunday Times 
2009; El Pais 2009), though other countries, including Kenya and Nigeria, have been 
implicated (Newswatch 1986; Wikileaks 2006). The state is described as being bought 
by powerful drug cartels, which gain official protection for their business or who co-
opt state actors into active positions within the trade (Costa 2008b). 
 
 The major dynamic behind this criminalisation trend are politicians and top 
officials seeking involvement in illegal commercial activities as a means to hold on to 
power (see also Reno 1998: 1-28). Bayart et al take the growth of the drug trade 
through Africa and reports of state involvement in it as their prime example of this 
trend. In fact, the effects of criminalisation are not necessarily seen as negative, as 
they argue that the drug trade is a way to re-integrate Africa into the world economy, 
rather than leaving it at the margins (Bayart et al 1999: 114-116). This creates the 
prospect of a revived, yet criminalised, development process on the continent.  
 
                                                        
4 For example, see the following report on drug use by ex-combatants in Liberia: 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81910 
5 During Klantschnig’s fieldwork, Nigerian drug law enforcers openly admitted the temptations that 
bribes from drug smugglers mean for junior and also senior officers. 
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In general, all these debates reflect real and potential dangers; however, it 
must be emphasised that a detrimental (or positive) effect of drugs on development in 
Africa has rarely been demonstrated through sound research. In fact, there has been 
little exploration of causality in all the hand-wringing about drugs and development 
(Costa 2008, UNODC 2010, USAID 2013). There are no data presented to support 
arguments of drug-related economic decline, nor any solid evidence that development 
would progress apace were it not for drugs. The most well-publicised case for a large-
scale negative impact of drugs is surely that connected with their smuggling and the 
connected state corruption in Guinea Bissau. But even here it is unclear whether the 
cocaine trade has triggered instability, corruption and violence, when the instability 
and corruption of the state pre-existed the country’s recent absorption into the 
international drugs trade (Forrest, 2003). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the 
cocaine trade as well as state involvement in it further exacerbated the serious 
problems facing the country (Vigh, 2012; Shaw, 2015).   
 
While all the above do suggest potential developmental harms linked to drug 
production, trade and consumption on the continent, we argue that they also reflect 
received wisdom about the impact of drugs on African societies. In what follows we 
suggest that there are different dimensions to the drug-development nexus, some of 
which are more positive in relation to poverty alleviation and livelihoods. This is 
especially so, we would argue, in relation to Africa’s two major drug crops – cannabis 
and khat – both of which are seen as major threats in much of the official discourse.   
 
Africa’s Drug Crops 
 
Globally drug crops have become a key economic resource for many farmers, and 
persuading – or forcing – those on the margins of the world economy to give up such 
sources of livelihoods has proved extremely difficult, whether in regard to coca 
farmers in South America, or opium farmers in Afghanistan (Buxton, 2015). This has 
been described as the ‘paradox for development initiatives’ posed by drugs, that 
despite their potentially negative impact on societies listed above, they provide poor 
households with opportunities in several parts of the world (Singer 2008b: 472). 
Similarly, in Africa drug crops are also entwined with livelihoods. Not all these crops 
are illegal. In fact, many African drug crops are ‘respectable’ and traded legally 
throughout the world: tea, coffee, kola and tobacco being good examples, while the 
production of alcoholic drinks – whether legally or illegally – is a major source of 
income at both a local and national level (Willis, 2002; Van den Bersselaar, 2007). 
However, in this article we focus on two in particular, one illegal – cannabis – and 
one legal in its main producer countries, but illegal in many other countries around the 
world, including the UK which banned the substance in 2014: khat. Both offer good 
examples of how illegal and ‘quasi-legal’ crops can become highly attractive 
especially in comparison with more ‘respectable’ cash crops (sometimes 
compensating for their decline), and both elicit praise in this respect from farmers and 
traders.6 
 
Cannabis 
                                                        
6 Note that we use the term trader as an umbrella category for people involved in the transport, 
wholesale, retail and smuggling of cannabis and khat. The term ‘trafficker’ is used interchangeably 
with ‘trader’, however, the former has clear negative connotations and is often used in official and law 
enforcement discourse (Zaitch, 2002).  
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Including North Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, the UNODC estimate that 
cannabis is grown in at least 43 of the continent’s countries, and that Africa accounted 
for 25 per cent of global cannabis production in 2005 (UNODC 2007: 2). Cannabis 
has a long history in Africa, especially in eastern and southern Africa: its use is no 
recent phenomenon, and nor is its cultivation (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012: 32-7). 
While thorough research into its early production is still in its early stages, there are 
clues in the chronicles of early explorers, such as cannabis used as part of the Bene 
Diamba ‘cult’ of Central Africa and dagga commonly used across southern Africa 
(Fabian 2000). An expanding cash economy generated some commoditization of 
cannabis even before its illegality, although the current boom in production owes 
much to the rise in value accruing to cannabis thanks to illegality.   
 
Cannabis production was commonplace throughout most the continent by the 
mid-twentieth century; however, production intensified in the 1980s (Du Toit, 1980; 
Akyeampong, 2005). The 1970s and 1980s were times of economic crisis and 
structural adjustment in much of Africa. Rising oil prices and declining terms of trade 
for export crops such as cocoa or coffee, combined with economic mismanagement 
led to an array of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in different African 
countries, which were marked by painful liberal economic reforms and a further 
deepening of the economic crisis (Williams 1994). These programmes would be 
implemented differently across the continent and at different times, but in most cases 
they negatively impinged on large sections of African society.7 The removal of trade 
barriers imposed under structural adjustment led to further crisis, as home-produced 
maize, rice and other crops faced competition from cheaper imports. This agricultural 
crisis was compounded by ecological degradation in several regions and the effects of 
drought. It is in this context that cannabis cultivation was seized upon by ever more 
farmers as a means to diversify agricultural output, cannabis forming what has been 
termeda ‘compensation crop’ (Perez and Laniel 2004: 125). 
 
 Chouvy and Laniel describe a boom in the cannabis economy following the 
introduction of SAPs as living conditions became more of a struggle and conflicts 
have proliferated - both factors they link to increased demand for cannabis. This 
hypothesised rise in demand and falling commodity prices spurred more farmers to 
produce a crop with many advantages, notably its tolerance of even poor quality soil 
(Chouvy and Laniel 2007: 140). Cannabis plants are also easy to grow among other 
crops, so allowing the plants to be easily hidden. In western Kenya much cannabis is 
grown among plantations of sugar cane and it is also often grown on very marginal 
land. Its cultivation is therefore not necessarily incompatible with the production of 
subsistence crops. Furthermore, the crop requires little input either of fertilizer and 
pesticide, or of labour. Of course, these advantages of cannabis as a cash crop would 
have little worth for farmers were it not in demand and marketable. Indeed, the 
relatively little research there is on cannabis in Africa shows how developed local, 
regional and global markets are for the commodity (Bernstein 1999; Klantschnig 
2013, Laudati 2014). Consumers interviewed in Nairobi also reported how cannabis 
sold there not only comes from local production zones, but also as far as Malawi and 
                                                        
7 SAPs were not always bad news for farmers, as, according to Gavin Williams, such policies 
sometimes raised prices for crops on local markets.  But such gains were usually outweighed by the fall 
in export prices (Williams 1994).  
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Ethiopia, suggesting both the scale of regional trade networks, and the demand that 
exists for non-local varieties. 
 
What evidence there is concerning the cultivation of cannabis in Africa supports 
the notion that cannabis is acting in some respects as a ‘compensation crop’, although 
it is far more integrated into some African economies than the term ‘compensation 
crop’ suggests (Laudati 2014). In the case of the small mountainous kingdom of 
Lesotho – one of the few African countries where significant research on cannabis 
production has been conducted – an increase in cannabis production is linked to a 
decline in wage-labour, high demand for cannabis in surrounding South Africa, and a 
landscape degraded by soil erosion caused in part by overgrazing. Lesotho has been a 
key labour reserve for South Africa, and 200,000 men – a large proportion of the 
population – found employment in South Africa in the 1970s, mainly in the mining 
sector (Bloomer 2009: 51). The migration patterns of Basotho men meant that 
remittances were a key part of the Lesotho economy, helping many in the rural areas. 
With increasing retrenchment in the 1990s following a fall in gold prices among other 
factors, remittances have decreased, and cannabis has filled the resultant gap in 
income for many Basotho, especially those in the rural areas, where it is now a major 
cash-crop. In fact, for the country as a whole, cannabis is a major source of foreign 
revenue, and ‘while there is no official data, other than police seizure statistics, all 
observers with knowledge of rural livelihoods in Lesotho agree that cannabis is the 
nation’s most significant cash crop’ (Bloomer 2009: 75ff). 
 
Cannabis has thus become an ever more critical part of rural economies since 
the 1980s, although the extent of its importance only became more widely appreciated 
since the 1990s. Cannabis is grown in all regions of this mountainous country, 
including on small plots in the capital Maseru, however the major areas of cultivation 
are in the mountain zones in central and eastern parts of the country (Laniel 1998). 
The crop is mainly grown by smallholders, often intercropped with maize, and there 
are reports of larger scale mono-cropping of cannabis on farms of around 3-5 hectares 
in area. Cannabis is planted between mid-August to mid-October, providing a first 
harvest of inferior product in January, and the main harvest from February to April. 
Most work on the crop is done by members of the household, although harvest can be 
a communal occasion with work parties enlisted to help. Farmers simply dry the crop 
and pack it into sacks, while some add extra value to their crop by preparing it into 
rolled cigarettes (Ibid.). 
 
Profits from cannabis are much higher further along the commodity chain – as 
traders boost its value to account for their risk – however, it still offers farmers much 
higher returns than other crops. In the late 1990s, profits from a hectare of cannabis 
were estimated at twenty times that for maize (Ibid.). In Bloomer’s more recent 
research in a Lesotho village called Botsoapa, cannabis was still the most reliable 
crop in the current economic climate, although prices fluctuate, and so profits are not 
guaranteed. Prices drop rapidly at harvest time due to the glut of the crop entering the 
market; thus, poorer farmers with little option but to sell the harvest straightaway fare 
badly compared with those who can store their harvest until prices rise once more 
(Bloomer 2009:51). In Botsoapa, approximately 28 percent of annual income derived 
from cannabis, though few farmers get rich from growing it, and, indeed, it was the 
poorer farmers who relied more on the crop; wealthier ones gained a higher 
proportion of income from non-farm income. Still, cannabis cultivation ‘has offered 
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the opportunity of generating an income from the resources available to almost every 
household in Botsoapa, namely land’ (Ibid.: 56).  
 
Cannabis is firmly integrated into the economies of several other African 
countries (Kepe 2003). This is the case also in Nigeria, although its recorded history 
is significantly shorter than in parts of southern and northern Africa (Klantschnig 
2014). Cannabis cultivation has been historically concentrated in South-Western 
Nigeria, while some cultivation has also been detected in other parts more recently 
(AEGD 2001: 7; UNODC 1999: 22). The majority of Nigeria’s cannabis grows in its 
highly fertile ‘cocoa belt’, which has been hit hard since the 1960s by declining prices 
for export crops (UNODC 1999: 49-51). It has also been relatively cheap and easy to 
produce cannabis in Nigeria’s cocoa belt, as experts in the 1960s already observed 
(Asuni 1964: 20-21). In line with the trend in Lesotho, cannabis has come to serve as 
a means of agricultural diversification for farmers facing declining terms of trade and 
state policies making the production and sale of legal crops difficult – a pattern 
observed in other West African countries too (UNODC 1999: 53). 
 
Moreover, cannabis has not only been a rewarding crop for farmers – who 
receive a relatively small share of the overall profits at the farm gate – but also for 
others involved in the trade (Reuter 2004: 130-1). Interviewed wholesalers who had 
worked in Northern Nigeria in the late 1990s and early 2000s confirmed cannabis’s 
lucrative nature. Not only has cannabis been one of the country’s flourishing trades 
despite recurring economic crises and adjustment, it has also provided employment 
for school leavers and graduates aspiring to be ‘successful’ in Northern Nigeria’s 
depressed and highly competitive labour market. Much of the wholesalers’ work 
involved regularly purchasing supplies in Nigeria’s producer regions and selling it on 
to buyers in the North, gaining hefty profits, which largely reflected the higher risks 
of detection along the supply chain (Cannabis entrepreneurs, interviews 1-4, 
25.09.2005). 
 
Wholesalers recounted how they owed to cannabis their successful 
entrepreneurial rise, even though there were high risks involved in this type of 
business. One of them started out as a motorcycle taxi driver in Kaduna in the late 
1990s and initially sold cannabis to some of his friends. As his consumer base grew, 
he began to buy from a supplier who transported the cannabis directly from Southern 
Nigeria to Kaduna. At the peak of his business, cannabis would earn him more than 
eight times the monthly salary of an early-career police officer. With 25 years of age 
and five years in the trade, he owned three motorcycles, a house, had financed his 
expensive wedding and supported several of his family members. While other 
wholesalers were not all as successful, most could not imagine a future outside the 
business (Cannabis entrepreneurs, interviews 1-4, 25.09.2005). Hence, this story and 
others of traders and farmers confirm Bernstein’s assertion that cannabis is one of 
Africa’s most dynamic and valuable non-traditional trades, on which many 
livelihoods in rural and urban Africa depend (Bernstein 1999: 30). 
 
Given the international disapproval of cannabis, one might wonder how farmers 
and traders feel about the crop, especially as economic pressure plays such a role in 
encouraging its production and sale. Based on the available case studies, there is great 
ambivalence among them: while many would readily grow and sell other products, for 
others it is hard to understand why cannabis is illegal given that it has been used in 
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some parts of Africa for so long, and given that the trade has been passed from 
generation to generation (Bloomer 2009; Cannabis entrepreneur, interview 2, 
25.09.2005). Also, given that anti-cannabis laws come from national governments 
often considered predatory by the poor – and from international bodies of little moral 
standing amongst them – it is easy to see how farmers and the urban poor are unlikely 
to worry about the morality of growing or selling cannabis. 
 
Khat 
 
Khat has for centuries been cultivated in parts of Ethiopia (Gebissa 2010), while 
cultivation in Kenya’s Nyambene Hills also dates back at least 150 years and most 
likely more. Alongside much of Northern Yemen, these three growing zones are those 
most associated with the crop, and those where it is grown most intensively. Worries 
about the supposed negative effects of khat upon society have long been present in its 
growing regions, and its history in Kenya is illustrative of the debates that come to 
revolve around such crops (Anderson and Carrier 2009). Increasing consumption in 
the lowlands of northern Kenya caused panic among colonial officers worried about 
its corrupting influence on local pastoralists. The khat they were consuming was 
coming from the Nyambene Hills northeast of Mount Kenya, a district inhabited by 
Meru agriculturalists. Unlike other cash crops introduced by settlers, khat was an 
indigenous crop commercialized by Africans (Goldsmith 1994), and the colonial 
authorities were taken aback when they finally researched the trade and realized how 
far Nyambene khat was travelling. By the late 1940s, it was already being exported as 
far as Dodoma in Tanganyika. Improved transport infrastructure and growing 
urbanization were both key factors in the spread of demand for a perishable 
commodity whose sociable stimulating properties (known as handas in Kenya) are 
valued in both recreation and work contexts. 
 
At first, concern about the health dangers of khat consumption won out, 
especially after the publication of a sensationalized special issue of the East African 
Medical Journal on the substance was published in 1945. This issue – though based 
on a tenuous evidence base – gave those campaigning against it the weapon they 
needed to push for control.8 Attempts to control the substance’s consumption in the 
colony through a permit system and an outright prohibition in the north were trialled. 
Amongst other absurdities, the permit system only allowed consumers certified as 
‘addicts’ the right to consume khat, as the administration thought they might ‘die’ 
without their fix of this relatively mild stimulant. This led to thousands of consumers 
throughout Kenya self-declaring themselves as addicts in order to be allowed their 
chew. 
 
Meanwhile Meru producers and traders were lobbying hard on behalf of the 
trade, stating how important the commodity had become for them both economically 
and culturally. With such lobbying and the obvious unworkability of the legislation, 
colonial officers in the most intensive production area of Meru district while initially 
suspicious of the crop soon came to see its worth for the economic development of the 
region. Having abandoned attempts at control except in the north, by the late 1950s, 
the colonial administration instead attempted to regulate and rationalize its production 
                                                        
8 Letter J.D. Rankine (Chief Secretary) to Provincial Commissioner of Central Province, 22/1/1948, 
Kenya National Archives VQ/11/4. 
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and trade through standardization and an aborted-attempt to create a co-operative 
system for the commodity. There was even talk among district officers about 
promoting the export of Kenyan khat to other consuming hotspots such as Aden in 
competition with Ethiopian and Yemeni khat.  While exuberance on behalf of the late 
colonial administration to promote the export of Meru khat abroad faded in the face of 
increasing international anxiety, production continued to grow along with demand 
(Carrier 2014). 
 
For much of the colonial era, Meru was the only district in Kenya where khat 
was produced in great quantities, and the Meru had honed their expertise with the 
crop over centuries, creating a sophisticated inter-cropping system that prevented soil 
erosion and protected other crops (Goldsmith 1994; Carrier 2007). Furthermore, 
alongside Arabs and Somalis – who have been involved in the trade in Kenyan khat 
for many decades – the Meru innovated much in regard to marketing.  The varying 
qualities and types of khat – distinguished by growing region, variety of tree, age of 
tree, part of the tree harvested, length of the stems and so forth – allowed it to be 
marketed for both wealthy and poor consumers, thus expanding its consumer base.   
 
Some colonial interference aside, Kenyan khat has received little in the way of 
government assistance, farmers and traders being left to their own devices. While not 
daring to antagonize farmers and traders, since Independence the Kenyan authorities 
have applied a policy of not encouraging, but not discouraging production of a crop 
that was bringing in substantial revenue through tax, and foreign exchange earnings 
with growing trade to Somalia. Goldsmith describes the further spurs to production in 
the Nyambenes provided by the spread of the Somali diaspora in the wake of its civil 
war of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Goldsmith 1999: 15-9). By the mid-1990s, 
increasing quantities of Kenyan khat were being sent as far afield as the UK and 
North America, and new areas of cultivation in the Nyambenes were opened up to 
satisfy this demand. Lack of official involvement in the trade means that accurate 
quantitative data are lacking, but by the early 2000s the most quoted figure was that 
the khat trade was bringing in $250 million a year to the Nyambenes (Carrier 2007: 
250). Indeed, rather than negatively affecting food security, such relatively high 
income levels have helped make the region more food secure in recent times than 
nearby districts where the dominant cash crops are tea, coffee and cotton (Goldsmith 
1994). 
 
Certainly the 2002 tonnes of Nyambene khat that until recently was being 
imported into the UK each year is indicative of the scale of production and 
importance of this crop for Kenya (Anderson and Carrier 2011). The economic value 
of this export was estimated at £12,740,000 (Carrier 2014: 117), and this is only a 
small proportion of the total production, most being consumed nationally or exported 
to Somalia. In the Nyambenes, farmers have constantly emphasized to researchers 
how much more valuable this crop is for them than more ‘respectable’ crops such as 
coffee (Carrier 2007: 57ff), and a recent estimate of potential income from khat in the 
main production region within the Nyambenes suggests a figure far higher than the 
Kenyan average (Baariu and Mulaku 2015: 60). Income comes not only from its 
farming, but also from its trade, as Meru are highly involved in its national retail trade 
and transport, while also entering into the international export business (Goldsmith 
1999). Khat’s cultural resonance for the Meru of the Nyambenes, has been enhanced 
and reinforced greatly by its economic worth to the district: it is so integrated into 
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culture and economy, that schools and churches in the region often have a few khat 
trees to help support themselves financially. In the Nyambenes, few see khat as a 
dangerous drug menacing society, but as the bedrock of the local economy. Earnings 
from the trade are not restricted to the Meru, but also spread to the thousands of 
Somali wholesalers and retailers scattered throughout northern Kenya and Somalia 
(Carrier 2007: chapter four). Somali involvement in the trade has also had a direct 
effect on the urban landscape of Nairobi, as capital from its international export was 
channelled into the Somali district of Eastleigh, capitalising a number of commercial 
ventures in what is now a global hub for clothing and textiles (Carrier 2016). In this 
regard, Eastleigh offers a clear example of how trade in such a ‘dubious’ substance 
can underpin economic growth. 
 
 The situation for khat farmers in the Nyambenes and in Ethiopia is not 
dissimilar to the one faced by cannabis cultivators in Lesotho and Nigeria: in Ethiopia 
Gebissa reports how khat has allowed producers to ride out economic shocks, and 
remain relatively food secure while improving their standard of living (Gebissa 2010: 
114). Khat growers earn around five times more cash-crop income than non-khat 
growers, while owning more livestock, farm implements, and other such indicators of 
relative prosperity (Tefera, Kirsten and Perret 2003). In fact, contrary to anxiety that 
khat is ‘taking the place of food’ (see below), the ability to feed children appears to 
increase proportionally with the amount of land dedicated to khat, and decrease with 
that dedicated to growing cereal crops. Indeed, a far more positive gloss can be placed 
on khat’s role in East Africa than given by development experts. Khat farmers have 
been increasingly able to divert income from khat into off-farm occupation, including 
transport, trade and retail sectors, allowing for migration to businesses in urban 
centres (Gebissa 2010: 124). 
 
As with cannabis, the story of khat’s role in development does not end in the 
main producer regions of Kenya and Ethiopia, however: it also now extends to 
growing production regions in Uganda and northern Madagascar, as well as 
generating livelihoods for its wholesalers, retailers and exporters (Carrier 2005). 
Indeed, in describing the expanding importance of khat production in several regions 
of Uganda, Beckerleg makes similar points concerning the positive role khat can play 
in improving rural livelihoods. So important is this indigenously developed crop, that 
she even goes as far as to state that khat is subversive to international development 
practices, many predicated on the role of the outside developmental agency: ‘Khat is 
subversive because in East Africa it has improved the lives of millions of poor people 
who are not part of development programs. Khat, I contend, renders “development” 
irrelevant to the lives and livelihoods of independent-minded producers and 
entrepreneurs’ (Beckerleg 2010: 182).  
 
Illicit and Quasi-Licit Livelihoods 
 
Thus, the support cannabis and khat provide to rural and urban livelihoods suggests 
that they can be assessed in a much more positive way than conventional wisdom 
would allow. However, how sustainable are these livelihoods linked to internationally 
reviled crops? Clearly, there are risks associated with cannabis and khat: vulnerability 
to law enforcement; little recourse to legal protection, certainly in the case of 
cannabis, although khat’s legality in producer countries affords some protection; the 
trade networks that farmers rely on to sell their crops at decent prices are vulnerable 
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to closure by law enforcement agencies; there is also vulnerability to change in 
demand and legal status, as well as competition from other growing regions. The 
dangers of reliance on khat has been demonstrated recently by the decision of the UK 
government to ban the commodity following international pressure from European 
countries that had already banned it, as well as domestic pressure from an anti-khat 
campaign waged in the main by members of the Somali diaspora (Carrier 2014). As 
tonnes of khat were leaving Kenya for the UK most days of the week, this had had a 
great impact on the growing regions, especially those which emerged to feed the 
European market. Given such risks and changing situations, would farmers be better 
placed eschewing khat and cannabis and sticking with either subsistence crops or licit 
cash crops? 
 
The decision to grow such crops must be placed in the context of a lack of 
alternatives. As we have seen, land pressure and degradation means that hardy, 
tolerant crops like khat and cannabis are sometimes the only ones that might thrive 
and provide an income that allows food security and some economic advancement 
(UNDP 2015; Buxton 2015). Also, there are many risks in all cash crops, even 
internationally approved of ones that are very much at the mercy of global markets 
and a world of trade imbalances heavily skewed in favour of the West (Tandon 2015), 
as well as drought, pests and lack of agricultural subsidies to help provide fertilizer 
and other such inputs. That cannabis and khat are delinked in various ways from the 
mainstream global economy can also be an advantage, insulating them from the 
uncertainties of the far-off markets that fix prices for the likes of coffee and tea, 
although, of course, both crops are enmeshed within their own regimes of value in 
which farmers often only accrue a small proportion of overall profits.9 
 
Furthermore, the argument that cannabis and khat take away land that could be 
better used for food crops, is an argument that would apply to other non-food cash 
crops such as tea, coffee and the vast quantities of flowers grown and exported 
globally from countries such as Kenya. In fact, cannabis and khat might allow more 
subsistence agriculture than ‘legitimate’ cash crops: cannabis does not require 
cultivation on the most fertile land – unlike other cash-crops – so can leave such land 
for food, while many farmers in East Africa intercrop other crops with khat, allowing 
a diversified approach to sustainable livelihoods (Carrier 2007: 35).  
 
Even the risk of arrest and incarceration or having ones crop of cannabis 
destroyed is low in many parts of rural Africa, where the power of the state is often 
too weak to reach farmers, and too constrained by a lack of will power in tackling a 
crop so fundamental to many livelihoods. Figures of authority are also at times 
implicated in the trade networks emanating out of production zones, and so have a 
vested interest in protecting farmers (Bloomer 2009; Klein, 2001). In a rational 
assessment of which crop to produce or trade, therefore, illegality – and the risk of 
future illegality – is for many farmers not the most critical factor. Certainly, as 
experience elsewhere in the world shows, until viable alternatives are found upon 
which livelihoods can be based, internationally-suspect crops such as cannabis and 
khat will continue to be farmed (Buxton 2015). As many African leaders have 
realized, international political will to combat the production of such crops in Africa 
                                                        
9 See Carrier 2007, chapter five, for a description of conflict between Meru farmers and Somali 
exporters at the turn of the millennium. 
  13 
is lacking, in contrast to the will to combat smuggling routes bringing harder drugs 
into Europe and North America (UNODC 2010b). The current political and economic 
state of affairs – as well as the fact that khat and cannabis are often culturally 
validated in Africa – means that such crops are likely to remain significant factors in 
rural livelihoods for the foreseeable future. 
 
This is not to deny the very real difficulties faced by African consumers of 
drugs – especially those using ‘harder’ drugs (McCurdy 2014), and the many children 
dependent on solvents – or the way that drug consumption (khat and cannabis 
included) can break people apart as well as bring them together, so negatively 
affecting livelihoods and development. But it must be stressed that the impact of 
drugs upon development in the African context – especially in rural regions – is far 
more complicated than the official views discussed above suggest. Certain ‘drugs’ 
can, in fact, be seen to play more positive roles in rural livelihoods.10  
 
However, this should not be seen as an argument that such drug crops and 
commodities could actually be a basis for more profound social and economic 
development: cannabis and khat are not panaceas for Africa’s developmental ills. This 
is especially so as they are often a way of diversifying and compensating for other 
declining incomes, and because, just like other commodities and cash crops, such 
drug crops expose farmers to new risks and uncertainties. Indeed, as Clapham 
observes in relation to khat, it would be foolish to ‘extol the crop as a potential basis 
for any broader process of sustainable development’ given the lessons of other crops 
whose boom years came to a very quick end (Clapham 2010: 206). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus, the received wisdom of drugs and development must be nuanced in relation to 
Africa’s drug crops. However, this begs the question of what policy can be enacted in 
relation to drugs to mitigate risks, including those that might prove impediments to 
development. This is all the more important to ask as there is increasing 
acknowledgement that current drug policy itself has capacity to ruin livelihoods and 
impede development, sometimes more so than the drugs themselves. Indeed, even the 
UN has recently acknowledged the ‘unintended consequences of drug control’, ‘the 
most formidable of which is the creation of a lucrative black market for controlled 
substances, and the violence and corruption it generates’ (UNODC 2009: 165). 
 
Indeed, in most African states, drug-supply control has clearly been prioritised 
and it is mainly petty cannabis traders, farmers and users who ‘meet justice’, as they 
are easy targets for law enforcement officers. In Nigeria, for instance, the great 
majority of drug related arrests and convictions are for the possession of small 
amounts of cannabis and for cannabis cultivation (Klantschnig, 2009). So-called 
‘alternative development’ programmes – substituting other crops for the likes of 
cannabis – have rarely been attempted by African governments. However, there is 
little reason to believe that such policies could be successful, as research in Latin 
America and Central Asia has shown that the value of drug crops is kept inflated by 
                                                        
10 Such questioning comes from all political directions, even from the World Bank (Keefer, Loayza and 
Soares 2008).  
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the risk factor created through prohibition (Buxton 2015). Our two case studies of 
khat and cannabis would also confirm this, as for alternative development to work, 
higher value crops than cannabis and khat have to be found, and the infrastructure 
established to make them a viable alternative: this requires much to go right, 
including demand for the replacement crops to be established.  
 
Finally, there is a sense that little drug-related change will be achieved until 
lives and livelihoods in general are improved. As the case of cannabis and khat 
production and trade have shown, the causality between drugs and underdevelopment 
can be questioned. While causality is difficult to prove – and drug trade and 
consumption continue among the wealthy in society too – poverty exacerbates 
problems associated with drugs (including legal ones such as alcohol), encouraging 
people to get involved in their profitable trade, and sometimes become problematic 
consumers. As Alexander shows, where problematic drug consumption is common, so 
are underlying societal ‘development’ problems, often linked to deprivation 
(Alexander 2010). McCurdy’s work on heroin use in Dar-es-Salaam also vividly 
shows the connection between marginalisation and addiction (McCurdy 2014). Many 
of these social and structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, social 
exclusion, violence or even war, require a more far-reaching approach than the one 
promoted by international drug policy makers and development planners (UNDP 
2015). Thus, truly tackling the problems associated with the drugs trade in Africa 
requires tackling these structural ‘development’ problems. Our case studies of 
cannabis and khat may offer livelihoods in hard times, but their popularity as 
commodities and cash crops speaks volumes about the asymmetries of global trade, 
where farmers in developing countries find more developmental benefits in such 
substances than in a mainstream global economy that is structured against them. 
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